ABSTRACT As an emerging technique in 5G cellular networks, D2D communication efficiently utilizes the available resources. However, the concerns of data security, identity privacy, and system scalability have not been sufficiently addressed. In this paper, we propose a robust and scalable data access control scheme (RSDAC) in D2D communication, where the key build block is a multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (MA-CP-ABE) with the large universe and verifiable outsourced decryption. In RSDAC, the system attribute universe is scalable, which is exponentially large without resource waste. Each base station (BS) governs the whole attribute universe individually. The data owner can define any monotonic access structure to encrypt its data. During the key generation phase, each BS can independently verify the user's legitimacy and then generate an intermediate key for the legal user according to its attribute set. A core network server (CNS) acts as the central authority which will generate the final private key for the user basing on his intermediate key. We also design an efficient method to offload the complicated decryption to some devices with adequate computation resource and further check the correctness of decryption result. The security analysis and performance comparison indicate that our scheme is secure, efficient, and applicable.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, device to device (D2D) communication has emerged as a promising technique to efficiently utilize the spectral resources in 5G cellular networks [1] , [2] , because of its inherent features, e.g., improving spectral efficiency, delay constrained, improving system capacity, etc. D2D communication enables the user equipments (UEs) to directly communicate with each other without being involved in the fixed network infrastructures, such as bluetooth, base stations (BSs) and access points (APs). By using D2D communication techniques, people can efficiently and rapidly share their data via various UEs. However, despite the above advantages, there are three main issues: data security, identity privacy and system scalability to be addressed before applying D2D communication in practice.
A. DATA SECURITY
As the UE connects with others directly, D2D communication might be vulnerable to many security attacks, such as channel eavesdropping and modification of data [3] . To resist suck attacks, a feasible way is to encrypt the data before transmitting it to others. The data owner should also indicate who is allowed to access the encrypted data. Meanwhile, the data should be accessed only by the authorized users and is confidential to the unauthorized users. However, traditional symmetric encryption and public key cryptology are not suitable for D2D communication applications, due to the complexity of key agreement and management.
B. IDENTITY PRIVACY
During sharing the data with some users, the data owner may want to hide his or the UE's identification information. For instance, a data owner shoots a scandal video by his mobile phone and transmits it to someone else, but he do not want to expose any information of himself and his device. If the identity privacy can not be guaranteed, it may result in inferior user experience of D2D communication.
C. SYSTEM SCALABILITY
While deploying D2D communication in real applications, the scalability of system is worth considering, due to that plenty of users and UEs are coexisting in the system. Once the system parameter size is set too small, the system may be thoroughly reconstructed in future. If the system parameter size is set too large, it would incur superfluous waste of resource.
To address the issues mentioned above, in this paper, we present a robust and scalable data access control scheme (RSDAC) for D2D communication. We construct a multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (MA-CP-ABE) scheme with large universe and verifiable outsourced decryption, and take it as the basis of the data access control scheme for D2D communication. In RSDAC, there are multiple base stations (BSs) and a core network server (CNS). Each D2D user equipment (DUE) can link to a BS directly or via the relay of a cellular user equipment (CUE), and is described by some attributes, such as spectrum, brand and trust level. Aiming to improve the efficiency of data encryption, we use key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to encrypt original data. That is, the original data is first encrypted by a chosen symmetric key (SEK ), then SEK is encrypted under a chosen access structure associated with attributes. Only the DUE whose attributes match the access structure can recover SEK and further decrypt the encrypted data. Different from most existing MA-CP-ABE schemes [4] - [7] , each BS in our RSDAC manages the whole attribute universe, handles the DUE legitimacy verification and generates the intermediate key for legal DUE according to its attribute set. The CNS is in charge of the registration of BSs and DUEs, and generates the private key for each DUE basing on its intermediate key. In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. To solve the issue of single-point bottleneck, the DUE legitimacy verification is separated from the private key generation. Every BS could independently verify the legitimacy of a DUE. We use an additional randomly chosen parameter to remove the restriction in [8] where the timestamp numbers should be different and not been used before.
2. RSDAC supports exponentially large attribute universe and constant size of system public parameters. We design a method to alleviate the user decryption cost by outsourcing the most complicated decryption operations to a third party (such as the DUE with sufficient computation resource). The correctness of returned partial decryption ciphertext from the third party can also be efficiently checked.
3. RSDAC supports any monotonic access structure. The security analysis and performance results demonstrate that RSDAC is secure, efficient and applicable.
II. RELATED WORK A. DATA ACCESS CONTROL IN D2D COMMUNICATIONS
Most extensive works [9] - [13] focused on interference management and resource allocation. Aiming to realize confidentiality and integrity for D2D communication in LTE-Advanced, Zhang et al. [3] presented a data sharing protocol by using signature and public key technique. However, the content providing server which administrates the register of all the devices might be a security and performance bottleneck of the system. Kwon et al. [14] showed that how to adopt ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) to design a D2D authentication protocol, where a group manager should be available. Huang et al. [15] and Yue et al. [16] investigated the fine-grained access control in cellular communication networks, where the connection between only UEs was not considered. Yan et al. [17] realized flexible data access control among lots of devices in D2D communication by employing ABE, where the attributes are described by twodimensional trust levels. However, their scheme can not support multiple authorities and the decryption cost is linear with the scale of involved attributes.
B. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION AND ITS APPLICATIONS
Various approaches [18] - [21] have been employed to preserve user privacy and data security in practice. As one of the most promising cryptographic techniques, ABE has been regarded as an important building block to design finegrained access control systems.
ABE was first introduced in [22] and further classified to two types: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [23] - [25] and CP-ABE [26] - [30] . Different from CP-ABE, KP-ABE associates the ciphertext with attributes and the private key with the access structure. In [31] , Yu et al. first adopted ABE to design fine-grained access control scheme for cloud computing. Since then, various data access control schemes based on ABE have been introduced.
Aiming to resolve the problem of single-point bottleneck, Xue et al. [8] proposed a new MA-ABE mechanism where the operation of user legitimacy verification is moved to the attribute authorities (AAs), and every AA can execute the user legitimacy verification by itself and generate intermediate key over the whole attribute universe. The randomness of private keys and collusion resistance rely on the difference of timestamp at that moment. To ensure the timestamp numbers are unique, the CA has to check the timestamp numbers are in the pre-defined time interval. Such method may bring additional computation cost for CA and the delay of key generation.
The large universe problem was first addressed in [22] . On composite order groups, Lewko et al. [32] introduced the first exponentially large universe KP-ABE scheme, whereafter Rouselakis et al. [33] demonstrated how to construct large universe ABE on prime order groups.
To realize efficient user decryption in ABE, Green et al. [34] introduced a decryption outsourcing method to offload most decryption operation to a third-party, which then returns a partial decryption ciphertext (PDC). Only one time of exponential operation on PDC is required by the user to recover the plaintext. However, the correctness of PDC can not be guaranteed. Lai et al. [35] designed a verification method to check the correctness of PDC. The ciphertext length and the encryption cost are almost twice of that in [34] . Ning et al. [36] presented an auditable CP-ABE scheme without adding any extra encryption overhead or ciphertext element, where the PDC is verified by taking in the system master secret key.
III. SYSTEM MODEL, ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. SYSTEM MODEL Fig. 1 describes the system model of RSDAC, which consists of four entities: core network server (CNS), base stations (BSs), cellular UEs (CUEs) and D2D UEs (DUEs). In RSDAC, the DUE can connect to the BS which covers it directly or by the relay of a CUE. In particular, we call a DUE the data owner (DO) if it launches the data sharing. Similarly, we call a DUE the data user (DU) if it is the receiver of some data. In additionally, a DUE or CUE with sufficient computation resource can serve as the outsourced decryption service provider (ODSP) for the DUs. The detailed function of each entity is given as follows:
CNS: CNS is a trusted central authority, which is in charge of initializing the system and generating the corresponding parameters. It also accepts the registration of the BSs and DUs. It labels each BS with a unique Bid and each DU with a unique Uid. Meanwhile, it creates the public-private key pairs for the BSs and DUs. Additionally, it also creates the final private key for each DU by employing the intermediate key (IK ) generated by a BS. If necessary, CNS can help DUs check the correctness of PDC.
BS: Every BS is in charge of verifying the legitimacy of a DU. If so, it generates IK corresponding to the DU's attribute set. Note that every BS in our system governs the whole attribute universe rather than a disjoint attribute subset which was introduced in prior works [4] , [5] , [24] , [37] . The DUE 4 is covered by BS 1 and BS N as in Fig. 1 , it can obtain the IK from either BS 1 or BS N .
DO: DO chooses a symmetric encryption key (SEK ) to encrypt its data. Then the DO defines an access structure under which SEK is encrypted. Finally, the encrypted data along with the ciphertext of SEK will be shared with the DUs.
DU: Each DU is assigned a unique Uid by the CNS and issued a public key and a user decryption key (UDK ). Each DU can call for the decryption service from the ODSP by submitting his private key. The DU can also call the CNS to check whether the returned PDC is correctly computed. If so, he can recover SEK by the UDK and further decrypt the encrypted data.
ODSP: ODSP could help the DU pre-decrypt a ciphertext according to its private key. If the DU's attributes match the access structure in SEK ciphertext, the ODSP will return a PDC.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In RSDAC, CNS is fully trusted. We assume that the BSs could be compromised and they may collude with each other to obtain the MSK . The ODSP is honest-but-curious. That is, it executes its task honestly, but it would try to get as much information as possible of the encrypted data. The DUs might be malicious by colluding with each other to obtain extra access privilege that none of them has.
Concretely, we consider the following security requirements:
1. Fine-grained access control. In order to indicate who is authorized to access its data, the DO should be enabled to define flexible access structure.
2. Data Confidentiality. The data must be confidential to unauthorized access from both unauthorized DUs and ODSP.
3. DUs Collusion Resistance. The malicious DUs may combine their private keys to get access to the ciphertext that none of them is allowed. Such collusion resistance should be resisted.
4. BSs' Ultra Vires Resistance. The BS can not directly issue private keys for the DUs. That is, the BS could not obtain the MSK of the system, even if it colludes with the others.
5. Verifiability. Once the ODSP returns a wrong or invalid partial decryption ciphertext, such malicious behavior must be efficiently detected.
IV. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAPS
G and G 1 refer to two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. η refers to a generator of G. e : G × G → G 1 is called a bilinear map if:
1. Bilinearity: e(ζ x , ξ y ) = e(ζ, ξ ) xy ∀ζ, ξ ∈ G and x, y ∈ Z p ; 2. Non-degeneracy: e(η, η) = 1 for g. 3. Symmetric: e(η ι , η υ ) = e(η, η) ιυ = e(η υ , η ι ).
B. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEME (LSSS)
Definition 1: A secret sharing scheme over a set of parties P is linear (over Z p ) if 1. The shares of a secret for each party form a vector over Z p .
2. A matrix A with rows and n columns is called the share-generating matrix for . ρ is a function which maps {i = 1, . . . , } to P. While considering the vector − → υ = (s, r 2 , . . . , r n ) T , where r 2 , . . . , r n are randomly picked from Z p and s ∈ Z p is the secret to be shared, then A − → υ denotes the vector of shares of s. The share (A − → υ ) i belongs to the party ρ(i).
Every LSSS has the linear reconstruction property [38] . Suppose that is an LSSS of an access structure A(A, ρ) and S ∈ A is any authorized set. Let I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , } be I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. There exist constants ω i ∈ Z p , such that, if λ i = (Aυ) i are valid shares of s, then i∈I ω i λ i = s.
C.h-TYPE ASSUMPTION
Choose a generator η from group G of prime order p. Randomly pickh + 2 exponents x, s, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , yh ∈ Z p . If an adversary is given (p, G, G 1 , e : G × G → G 1 ) and all of the following elements:
The advantage with which an algorithm B can solve the above decisionalh-type problem is defined as:
where e(η, η) xh +1 s ∈ G 1 and R ∈ G 1 is randomly selected. Definition 2: Theh-type assumption holds if Adv B(λ) is negligible of λ for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries.
D. DEFINITION OF MA-CP-ABE WITH VERIFIABLE OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION
A MA-CP-ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption is comprised of the following nine algorithms:
Global Setup (λ, U ) → (GPK , MSK ): A CA runs this algorithm by taking in a security parameter λ along with the system attribute universe U . It outputs the global public parameters GPK and master secret key MSK .
AA 
E. SECURITY MODEL
The security definition of our MA-CP-ABE is given by the following game between an adversary A and a challenger B. Identical to the security model in [8] , [33] , in our game, the challenge access structure chosen by A has to be declared before initializing GPK .
Initialization. A specifies the challenge access structure A * .
Setup. By running the Global Setup, AA Setup and User Setup algorithms, B generates the corresponding parameters and transmits the public parameters to A. Similarly, the verifiability model of our MA-CP-ABE is defined by the following security game between A and B.
Setup. A and B act the same as in the above security game. Definition 4: Our MA-CP-ABE is verifiable if no PPT adversary can get a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the detailed construction of the proposed RSDAC. Table 1 gives the description of notations employed in this scheme.
A. INITIALIZATION 1) GLOBAL SETUP
The CNS first calls the group generator and gets the terms GG = (p, G, G 1 , e), where p refers to the prime order of groups G and G 1 , and e denotes a bilinear map e : G × G → G 1 . Then, CNS randomly picks η, w, ϑ, ψ, v from G and α, β from Z p . Besides, CNS chooses a hash function H : (0, 1) * → Z p . The system attribute universe is implicitly set as Z p . Finally, the system public key is published as: GPK = (GG, η, w, ϑ, ψ, v, e(η, η) α , H ). The system master secret key is MSK = (α, β) which will not be transmitted to any other entity.
2) BS SETUP
When a BS joins in the system, it has to register itself from the CNS. For each BS, CNS labels the BS by a unique identifier Bid and randomly selects SK Bid = k Bid ∈ Z p , CNS then sets its public key as PK Bid = (η k Bid , w k Bid ). Then CNS sends (PK Bid , SK Bid ) to the corresponding BS with identity Bid.
B. DATA OUTSOURCING
Same as [36] , we use key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to encrypt original data. That is, the original data is encrypted by a symmetric key (SEK ) which will be encrypted under a chosen access structure.
Encrypt. The DO performs the data encryption algorithm as follows: DO defines an LSSS access structure A(A, ρ), where A refers to a × n matrix and ρ maps each row A τ to an attribute. DO randomly picks s, υ 2 , . . . , υ n from Z p and sets a vector − → υ = (s, υ 2 , . . . , υ n ) . In then computes − → λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ ) = A · − → υ and C 0 = η s . For each τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }, it randomly picks x τ ∈ Z p and computes:
The SEK in KEM is set as e(η, η) αs and the encrypted data is denoted as EN KEM . The ciphertext of SEK is CT = (C 0 , {C τ,1 , C τ,2 , C τ,3 } τ ∈{1,2,..., } ).
C. USER KEY GENERATION 1) USER SETUP
The new joined DU has to register itself from the CNS. For each DU, CNS assigns a unique identification Uid and randomly picks c Uid ∈ Z p . It then sets the DU's public key PK Uid = η c Uid . Finally, CNS gives PK Uid and the corresponding user decryption key (UDK = c Uid ) to the user with identity Uid.
2) BS KEYGEN
When receiving the private key request from a DU with identity Uid, the BS i first checks if the DU's Uid has the specified attribute set S Uid that it claimed as in [8] . If not, BS i submits the identity information of Uid to CNS which may subsequently kick this user out. Otherwise, BS i works as follows:
Firstly, BS i queries the current timestamp value TSV and calculates t 1 = H (Uid||TSV ||0) and t 2 = H (Uid||TSV ||1).
Secondly, for each AT τ ∈ S Uid , BS i randomly picks a j ∈ Z p and computes:
The intermediate key of S Uid is set as
Finally, the terms: (Uid, Bid i , S Uid , TSV , IK Uid ) are securely sent to CNS.
3) CNS KEYGEN
After receiving the terms from BS i , CNS checks if the transmission delay is appropriate. If not, CNS refuses to accept the terms. Otherwise, CNS works as follows:
Firstly, CNS obtains PK Uid and PK Bid i by Uid and Bid i . It then sets t 1 = H (Uid||TSV ||0) and t 2 = H (Uid||TSV ||1).
Secondly, CNS randomly chooses d ∈ Z p and uses MSK to create the private key SK Uid :
For each AT τ ∈ S Uid , compute:
For simplicity, we let r τ = k Bid dβa j t 1 + dαa j t 2 and r = k Bid dβt 1 + dαt 2 .
Therefore, SK Uid can be denoted as:
is sent to the DU via BS i .
D. DECRYPTION AND VERIFICATION

1) TRANSFORM
After receiving EN KEM and CT from DO, DU can request the ODSP to decrypt the data that it wants to access by submitting its attribute set S Uid , SK Uid and CT . If S Uid satisfies A(A, ρ), the ODSP works as follows:
Set X = {x : ρ(x) ∈ S Uid } and compute such coefficients
The ODSP sends PDC to the DU.
2) USER DECRYPTION
The DU can recover SEK by computing SEK = PDC 1/UDK = (e(η, η) αsc Uid ) 1/c Uid = e(η, η) αs .
3) VERIFICATION
After receiving (PDC, PK Uid , C 0 ), the CNS checks if the following equation holds: e((PK Uid ) α , C 0 ) = PDC. If so, CNS outputs 1 to indicate that the ODSP computes PDC correctly. Otherwise, It outputs 0 to indicate that the ODSP does not correctly compute PDC.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL
In RSDAC, the attribute universe is exponentially large. The DO can define arbitrary monotonic access structure over descriptive attributes, to indicate who has the access privilege to its data. Moreover, if a DO receives and stores the system public parameters on its device, then it can independently encrypt its data under the access structure, no matter it has connected to a BS or not.
B. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
The data confidentiality of RSDAC is proved by the following theorem: Theorem 1: Assume theh-type assumption holds, then our RSDAC is selectively secure.
Proof: Recall that the DU's private key SK Uid is in the form of:
where k Bid dβa j t 1 + dαa j t 2 and k Bid dβt 1 + dαt 2 are simplified as r τ and r, respectively. Meanwhile, because of the randomly chosen a j and d, {r τ } and r can be seen as totally random numbers. Thus, this theorem can be proved similarly to that in [36] , where the details of proof are given. Theorem 1 holds means that the ciphertext is confidential to the DU if its attributes do not match A(A, ρ) in CT .
Moreover, even if the ODSP obtains the user's private key while providing outsourced decryption service, the encrypted data remains secret since that the user decryption key UDK is not given to the ODSP.
C. USER COLLUSION RESISTANCE
By combining their private keys, the malicious DUs may attempt to recover SEK = e(η, η) αs that none of them can independently do. Unfortunately, they will fail due to the fact that each DU's private key elements are bounded by a unique chosen number d. Since d is chosen by CNS and is unknown to the DUs, it remains impossible for colluding DUs to access unauthorized data.
Different from the scheme [8] , the randomness of the DU's private key in RSDAC not only relies on the timestamp numbers t 1 and t 2 , but also the unique number d. Thus, there is no requirement of employing extra master secret key b and computing η −(t 1 +t 2 ) and η (t 1 +t 2 ) as in [8] . Moreover, a malicious DU in our RSDAC can not deduce any useful element from his private key to gain additional access privilege.
D. BSS' ULTRA VIRES RESISTANCE
The BSs may collude with each other to gain the system secret information about α and β. In [8] , the authors showed how the colluded BSs act. Suppose BS 1 and BS 2 choose the same terms (t 1 , t 2 ), η α can be computed by theses two BSs, which then can generate any effective private key and access any encrypted data. Such collusion attacks are resisted by ensuring the terms (t 1 , t 2 ) are different and never used before. However, in RSDAC, we introduce an additional parameter d which is unique for every attribute set. Even if BS 1 and BS 2 set the same terms (t 1 , t 2 ), they can not cancel dαt 2 in the exponents because of the different d i for each attribute set. Thus, the colluded BSs can not obtain any useful information of η α . VOLUME 6, 2018 
E. VERIFIABILITY
Theorem 2: For all PPT adversaries, the advantage is at most negligible in the verifiability security game.
Proof: We assume there exists an adversary A which can break the verifiability of our scheme, then a simulator B can be built to interact with A as follows:
Setup. B initializes the system and sets the system parameters GPK , MSK and {(PK Bid , k Bid )} as in the real scheme. It then sends GPK and {(PK Bid , k Bid )} to A. Table 2 compares some features between previous related CP-ABE works and RSDAC, involving multi-authority, robust AA/BS, large universe, access structure, outsourced decryption and verifiability.
From Table 2 , we can see that only the scheme in [8] and RSDAC achieve the robust AA/BS. That is, each AA/BS is in charge of governing the whole attribute universe of system. Except the schemes in [6] , [8] , [17] , the other schemes can support large attribute universe. The user decryption overhead in [8] , [17] , [33] increases with the number of used attributes. On the contrary, the user decryption overhead in [6] , [7] , [36] and RSDAC is constant size by employing the outsourced decryption technique. Only RSDAC and the scheme in [36] enable the users to check the correctness of PDC. However, the scheme in [36] only supports the single authority, without considering multiple attribute authorities. In general, RSDAC is the only one which simultaneously achieves the promising features mentioned above.
B. NUMERAL COMPARISON
In Table 3 , we compare the large universe schemes [7] , [33] , [36] and RSDAC, in terms of the size of system public parameters (PK), user's private keys (USK), ciphertext (CT) and the entry sent for verifying (ESV). Different form the AA's parameters {APK f } in the scheme [7] , the BSs' parameters {PK Bid } in our scheme is only used by the CNS and will not be involved in the encryption phase. Thus, we do not record the size of {PK Bid } in the size of PK. In Table 3 , |G| and |G 1 | refer to an element in G and G 1 , respectively. S E and S U refer to the related attribute sets involved in the CT and SK, respectively. Besides, S A denotes the set of attribute authorities. Table 3 shows that the PK size of RSDAC is the same as in the schemes [33] , [36] , which is less than that in [7] . Except that in the scheme in [36] , the size of USK is the same in other schemes. Specially, the size of CT and ESV in [36] and RSDAC is the same. RSDAC does not add any extra elements while achieving multi-authority and robust BSs. Thus, the proposed RSDAC is considerable and applicable in D2D communications.
C. IMPLEMENTATION RESULT
We implement our scheme, the NCDLMW scheme [36] and the LZ scheme [7] . All these three schemes are constructed on the large universe scheme [33] . The implementation is performed on a Ubuntu 18.04 LTS system (with 3.40GHz Inter Core i7 CPU and 8.00GB RAM), based on the JPBC library 2.0.0 [39] . We employ a Type A pairing which is constructed over a symmetric elliptic curve α-curve with 160-bit prime order p.
In Fig. 2 , we evaluate the computation cost during the phase of encryption, key generation and user decryption. Each simulation result is the average of 30 trials. Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(d) demonstrate that the time of encryption and user decryption in RSDAC is almost the same as that in NCDLMW scheme and LZ scheme. More precisely, the encryption overhead of these three schemes is linear with the scale of access structure. The only difference is that the element e(η, η) αs in NCDLMW scheme and RSDAC is set as SEK in KEM, while e(η, η) αs is used to encrypt the data encryption key in LZ scheme. Additionally, the user decryption in these three schemes only costs one time of exponential operation due to the usage of outsourced decryption technique [34] . Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(c) show that our scheme requires more computation time in the phase of AA/BS keygeneration and CA/CNS keygeneration than that in NCDLMW scheme and LZ scheme. This is due to the fact that we use the method to avoid the single-point bottleneck as in [8] , where the computation cost for each attribute is twice of that in the original scheme [40] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have addressed three major problems of data security, identity privacy and system scalability in D2D communication, by presenting a data access control scheme for D2D communication with robust multiple authorities, large attribute universe and verifiable outsourced decryption. In particular, each of multiple BSs can complete the task of DU legitimacy verification individually. Different from most prior multi-authority works, each BS can generate intermediate attribute keys according to arbitrary subset of whole system attribute universe. Such keys would be employed by the CNS to create the finally private keys. we also provided an efficient approach to help DUs offload most decryption overhead to a third device and check whether the device has correctly computed. The security analysis, numeral comparison and experimental results showed that RSDAC is secure, efficient and applicable in D2D communication scenario.
Although the verification of DU legitimacy is offloaded to the BSs, the single CNS remains has to create the final private keys for all DUs in the system. It would be interesting to design a more efficient key generation algorithm, where multiple CNSs exist and each of them can independently finish the generation of final private keys. He has published over 200 papers on information and communication area, such as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS. He is leading a big group and multiple funds on IoT and wireless communications with the current focus on architecture and enabling technologies for the Internet of Things. VOLUME 6, 2018 
